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A GLOBAL TUG OF WAR: A
TOPOGRAPHY OF MICRO-BUSINESS
FINANCING
LOUISE GULLIFER* AND IGNACIO TIRADO**
I
INTRODUCTION
Micro-businesses are the lifeblood of any functioning economy; they are more
numerous and, collectively, have a higher turnover than any other form of
business in the majority of countries around the globe. In all parts of the world,
developed and underdeveloped, however, they are starved of finance, and the
finance that is available is often on unsuitable and unsatisfactory terms. This
article maps out both the reasons for this phenomenon and particular problems
caused by the unique characteristics of micro-businesses, and suggests some legal
and institutional responses. Some responses are designed to increase access to
finance for micro-businesses by proposing measures to eliminate barriers,
decrease costs, and increase lender certainty. Others, however, are suggested in
order to protect the borrowers, because, by their nature, micro-businesses are
vulnerable to abuse of bargaining power, and, since many of the risk-takers are
individuals, lack of protection leads to social problems. These two rationales for
legal response are in direct tension with each other, in that a legal response
designed to achieve the former usually cuts across the aim of the latter and vice
versa. Without an appropriate balance being reached, changes designed to
facilitate the financing of micro-businesses can either become so oppressive that
the very people the changes are designed to assist fail to thrive economically or
socially, or may go too far towards protecting the borrowers and fail to increase
access to credit. The actual decisions as to the appropriate balance are, of course,
a matter of policy and will vary from state to state, depending on many factors.
This article merely seeks to identify responses and the resulting tensions, and to
begin to map out a framework for achieving that appropriate balance.
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II
THE SCOPE OF THE ARTICLE
It is first necessary to define what is meant by the term ‘micro-business’ in this
article. Three measures are commonly used to define a very small business: the
number of employees, the value of the business assets, or the turnover of the
business. In this article, the World Bank’s definition of a micro-business is used,
namely an enterprise with not more than four employees. This includes both
informal businesses and registered micro-businesses.1
Micro-businesses usually take one of two legal forms: either a legal entity,
with or without limited liability, often involving registration and some
formalities,2 or a sole entrepreneur.3 This latter phrase refers to an individual
operating a business in his own name, either with or without employees.
Whichever legal form the micro-business takes, the individual who runs it is
exposed to financial risk, either as a sole entrepreneur or as a guarantor of the
debts of the legal entity of which he is the director.
The vast majority of businesses in every country and globally are microbusinesses. For example, in 2011, 91% of all Micro, Small, and Medium
Enterprises (“MSMEs”), which includes enterprises with 250 employees or
fewer4 were micro-businesses, while in developing economies, the figure was
93%.5 Not only are micro-businesses important in terms of numbers, it is critical
that they thrive for any economy to grow. This is because almost all enterprises
start off as micro-businesses: they are the way that innovation and
entrepreneurism flourish in an economy. Moreover, micro-businesses tend to be
started, and run by, the young, marginalized groups such as women or minorities,
and those who have lost jobs. Thus, encouraging micro-businesses has an
important social as well as economic function.
There is, globally, a severe problem of lack of availability of finance to microbusinesses.6 Over 200 million micro-businesses in the world were “unserved,”
that is, they needed credit but had no access to credit, or “underserved,” that is,
they had a loan or a line of credit but were constrained as to the amount of
available financing.7 The types of finance available are also very limited. Bank
finance is rarely available, and most micro-businesses operate on very limited
1. See IFC Enterprises Finance Gap Database: Methodology, SME FIN. FORUM, http://www.
smefinanceforum.org/data-sites/ifc-enterprise-finance-gap [https://perma.cc/MZ4U-D444] (last visited
Nov. 6, 2017).
2. Some jurisdictions have introduced a simpler corporate form for micro-businesses, in order to
reduce the costs of incorporation. See, for example, an explanation of the Colombian Sociedad por
Acciones Simplificada in Francisco Reyes, The Colombian Simplified Corporation: An Empirical
Analysis of a Success Story in Corporate Law Reform, 4 PA ST. J. L. & INT’L AFF. 392 (2015).
3. This article uses this term, but other terms are also commonly used, such as “individual
merchant” in civil law jurisdictions and “sole trader” in common law jurisdictions.
4. See IFC Enterprises Finance Gap Database: Methodology, supra note 1.
5. See IFC Enterprise Finance Gap Database: Data, supra note 1.
6. See IFC Enterprises Finance Gap Database: Methodology, supra note 1.
7. See id.; IFC Enterprise Finance Gap Database: Media, supra note 1.

GULLIFER_TIRADO_CROSS REFERENCED PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

No 1. 2018]

4/17/2018 4:50 PM

A GLOBAL TUG OF WAR

111

equity finance plus trade credit, that is, credit provided by suppliers of goods and
services. In addition, where available, they rely on Government backed schemes,
such as lines of credit and guarantee schemes, and some local assistance, such as
guarantee schemes that associations of micro-businesses and chambers of
commerce create. The next part of this article provides a more detailed discussion
of debt financing options available in the private sector to micro-businesses.
III
AN OVERVIEW OF THE FINANCING OF MICRO-BUSINESSES
A. Types of Finance for Micro-Businesses
Micro-businesses may access finance in a number of ways. Equity financing is
very rarely sufficient, equipment is often acquired using asset finance, and trade
credit may also be relied on once the business has been established. However,
this article does not focus on these types of financing, because problems specific
to micro-businesses are not so acutely present in these areas. In terms of cash
flow lending, micro-businesses mainly resort to two types of finance providers:
banks or micro-finance institutions. Access to finance from banks presents a
number of problems, identification of which constitutes the main bulk of this
article, and which will be analyzed in detail in the following parts.8 The analysis
essentially focuses on how to adapt standard banking machinery to the financing
requirements of the smallest borrowers. Micro-finance institutions, briefly
described in the next part, are, however, entirely different. This type of finance is
an alternative to the general use of the financial system, but a limited one for
various reasons. First, it involves very small debtors, borrowing very small
amounts; secondly, it has a strong social component; thirdly, the risk assessment
methodology, credit monitoring, and collection methods are uniquely adapted to
certain types of businesses and communities; and fourthly, because it mainly
thrives in developing nations. Spreading its use as a solution to the lack of access
to finance is not a realistic possibility.
B. Main Elements and Problems of Micro-Financing Institutions
Because of their size and their cost structure, there is a limit to how far down
the lending market banks are able to go: the smallest, most informal, most
unsophisticated, micro-businesses that require small loans and have little or no
collateral to offer, often find themselves outside that market. A special type of
financial institution, often unregulated or only subject to basic regulation and low
intensity supervision, and frequently non-deposit-taking, exists to fill the gap.
Micro-finance institutions have flourished in developing and middle income
economies, operating either as private financial businesses or under the auspices
of Governments or international donors and financial institutions.9 Their goal is
8. See discussion infra Parts IV.B., IV.C.
9. See The World Bank Group and Microfinance, INT’L FIN. CORP., http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/
connect/industry_ext_content/ifc_external_corporate_site/financial+institutions/resources/the+world+b
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not just to make a profit: they tend to have a strong social component, financing
sectors of society traditionally excluded from market practice, such as women,
contributing to the education of the population, and helping to develop local
markets.
The target clients of micro-finance institutions are mostly individuals with
very low incomes and very limited means. They possess no, or very few assets to
provide as collateral. Their activity is conducted in an informal manner, with little
or no financial information available for lenders and they are often, despite the
efforts of international financial institutions, not included in the scope of credit
reporting systems. There is, thus, very limited financial information available for
lenders. Although some borrowers have businesses in cities, much of the activity
is rural, and tends to be widely spread out in the countryside, especially in
countries where infrastructures are deficient. Micro-finance institutions are
willing to lend small, or very small, amounts to be repaid in a very short period
of time. The financial instrument most widely used is the (short) term loan, and,
unless the government or international donors support the micro-finance entity,10
interest rates tend to be high or very high.
Micro-finance institutions operate in a manner based on classic relationship
banking, adapted to the circumstances of developing countries. The decision to
lend is made locally, by local people who are physically close to borrowers, whom
they often know personally. It is taken based on the repayment capacity of the
borrower and on his business plan (or rather, on a basic projection of his short
term future revenues). The assessment of the plan is done personally, and hence
it is costly and often slow. Monitoring takes place through direct contact, which
is frequent and regular. Although loans are almost inevitably short, or very short,
term, the underlying business model is to establish a stable lending relationship:
replacing one loan with the next, repeatedly, so as to help the business to grow.
This long-term relationship approach works, in a way, as a form of security: the
more loans are repaid, the more certain it is that the debtor is reliable and worthy
of future support. This, in turn, lowers the transaction costs, makes financial
accounting less relevant, and the micro-finance entity’s decision-making process
becomes more nimble and streamlined. It also means that collateral is not often
required.
Sometimes, especially when larger amounts are at stake, micro-finance
institutions promote group lending. Several micro-businesses group together to

ank+group+and+microfinance [https://perma.cc/JA7T-LGXL] (last visited Nov. 6, 2017) (explaining the
leading role of the World Bank, and, in particular, the International Finance Corporation, in microfinance activity).
10. “Official sector” support may take different forms. Sometimes micro-finance institutions
themselves are run by the government institutions or international donors; more frequently support takes
the form of guarantee schemes, whereby a public or an international entity guarantees, in whole or in
part, the loans provided by micro-finance institutions so as to lower the price. Another possibility is the
setting up of funds or the provision of large amounts of money to banks, which will in turn create microfinance entities to lend out these funds. This, then, combines development subsidies with the expertise
of private financial professionals.
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receive the funds, for which they will usually be jointly liable. This type of lending
drastically reduces the danger of moral hazard, as well as reducing monitoring
costs, because each borrower monitors the others. Where these types of lending
schemes, either group or individual, operate, communities tend to be small and
everyone knows one another. The preservation of reputation is therefore a very
important incentive to repay the loan. Being shamed within the community is
considered, in many rural areas, a hazard that must be avoided at all costs. These
factors explain why the percentage of non-performing loans (“NPLs”) in the
micro-finance industry tends to be low—usually lower than the level of NPLs in
the rest of the financial sector in the jurisdiction.
Micro-finance institutions have also been subject to stark criticism. Privately
run entities frequently charge very high interest rates. All too often these
institutions are unregulated and unsupervised, and abuses happen. Further, there
is a line of economic thought contending that overall numbers show that microfinance does not help countries develop, because businesses set up with this
money are too basic, often repetitive, and have little or no added value, and the
use of resources in these unviable businesses deflects capital that would otherwise
be available for consumption.11 In any case, and although it seems difficult to
deny the positive effects that micro-businesses have had in the societies of
developing nations, this sort of financing of micro-businesses is limited in scope
and cannot be taken as a general mechanism for access to finance in the more
developed jurisdictions, where the problem of access to finance also exists.
However, certain elements of the micro-finance system, such as personal
assessment of viability and regular monitoring, should also be features of bank
lending to micro-businesses.
IV
THE GEOMETRY OF LENDING TO MICRO-BUSINESSES
A. Introduction
This section purports to analyze the different stages in the financing of microbusinesses, covering the entire life-cycle of credit and identifying the main
problems that arise in each phase: the origination of credit (that is, access to
finance), the development of the financing relationship between a micro-business
and a financial institution, and the termination of the financing operation, with
special reference to the problems arising on the verge of insolvency and once
default has occurred. This article will focus on debtors and creditors, and consider
the problems from an ex ante and an ex post perspective.

11. See generally DAVID ROODMAN, DUE DILIGENCE: AN IMPERTINENT INQUIRY INTO
MICROFINANCE (2012); Milford Bateman & Ha-Joon Chang, Microfinance and the Illusion of
Development: From Hubris to Nemesis in Thirty Years, 1 WORLD ECON. REV. 13 (2012) (presenting a
well-documented, albeit controversial, critical analysis of micro-finance).
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B. The Origination of Credit
1. The Information Problem
One of the main reasons for the unavailability and high cost of finance for
micro-businesses is that such businesses are often unable to provide adequate
financial information at the time they apply for a loan. This is especially true for
informal micro-businesses: unincorporated businesses or other businesses that
operate actively in the market without being registered in a business registry or
with tax authorities.12 However, this is also true for some formal but very small
businesses. Micro-businesses often do not file financial accounts, even if required
to do so; moreover, many do not prepare financial accounts in a manner that
sufficiently reflects their annual result and financial situation. There are various
reasons for this. Those running the business do not see the need to do so because
their business activity is very simple; they have few sources of income and
creditors, a limited number of repetitive operations, and no or very few
employees. Frequently, the business activity involves family members, so
professional and family assets are not strictly separated. Moreover, those running
micro-businesses lack the expertise to draw up financial information. The lack of
adequate accounts is one reason why lenders do not assess the viability of
potential borrowers on a case-by-case basis.13 Instead, they either make lending
decisions on limited, standardized information, using other means to protect
themselves,14 or they just do not lend at all. The lack of insistence by lenders on
proper financial information contributes to the existence of an untaxed economy,
to the detriment of the public interest.
This information problem can be tackled in a number of ways. The best time
to deal with it is when credit is originated. At this point, the debtor has the
greatest incentive to produce and transmit sound financial and business
information requested by the lender, because if it does not, no finance will be
forthcoming. Banks are under a general duty to conduct proper risk assessments,
in fulfillment of which they should require simple, but accurate, accounts to be
produced by micro-businesses as a condition of considering their applications for
loans. Of course, micro-businesses should not be required to keep complicated
records or to produce complex financial statements. As in everything else
concerning access to finance, a balance needs to be struck. Although microbusinesses must be required to produce sufficient and adequate financial
information, this should be in a simplified manner to avoid overburdening
businesses that have few personnel and limited material resources.15 Requiring
12. The degree of informality tends to be higher with the lower the level of economic development
of the jurisdiction. See IFC: Enterprise Finance Gap Database: Media, supra note 1. According to a World
Bank Group report, by October 2013, about 80% of all businesses in developing nations were either
informal or had no employees. See id.
13. See discussion infra Part IV.B.2.
14. See infra Parts IV.B, IV.C, IV.D.
15. See 2015 IFRS for SMEs, IFRS, http://www.ifrs.org/issued-standards/ifrs-for-smes/ [https://
perma.cc/U58X-X3KM] (last visited Nov. 6, 2017) (announcing information sharing standards for small
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this information is only a solution if the potential borrowers are honest. The
existence of objective reservoirs of credit information, accessible to all lenders, is
also critical. Credit reporting systems, including credit registries, credit bureaus,
and commercial credit reporting entities, if adequately designed, can provide
information which is very relevant to assessing the risk of lending.16 These
systems should include information from as many sources as possible, going well
beyond credit records from financial institutions. Most micro-businesses also
obtain credit from suppliers and utility companies, and information from,
particularly, the latter should be included in the credit reporting systems. Further,
credit reporting systems should include positive, and not just negative, credit
information, as well as information about the behavior of company owners and
directors because, in the case of micro-businesses, the decision to lend will often
depend on the credit history of the owner as well as the characteristics of the legal
entity.17 Furthermore, the systems’ information should be accessible to every
possible credit provider, not only to financial institutions as is often the case.18
2. The Costs of Assessing Risk
As mentioned above, when deciding whether to lend to micro-businesses,
banks do not always conduct proper, case-by-case, risk assessments based on the
viability of the potential borrower.19 There are economic reasons for this, in
addition to the lack of information discussed in the previous section. The small,
or very small, size of the loans compared to the overhead costs of implementing
a stable risk management structure, makes lending too expensive. The costs of
lending can only be covered if a large volume of business is achieved. Thus,
lenders prefer to look for cheaper techniques that can be used to mitigate risk as
alternatives to individual risk assessment. But banks deal with risk—for all

and medium size enterprises (SMEs), while accounting for costs to those enterprises, although not
focusing on micro-businesses); see generally Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes:
Accounting & Auditing, WORLD BANK, http://www.worldbank.org/en/programs/rosc [https://perma.cc/
RQ5J-Q3QH] (last visited Nov. 6, 2017) (reflecting the tension between requiring sufficient and
adequate financial information, while attempting to avoid overburdening businesses).
16. See THE WORLD BANK INT’L COMM. ON CREDIT REPORTING, FACILITATING SME
FINANCING THROUGH IMPROVED CREDIT REPORTING, 10–13 (2014), https://openknowledge.
worldbank.org/handle/10986/21810 [https://perma.cc/6KVD-G3R3] (providing an analysis on the
influence of credit reporting systems in facilitating access to credit for small and medium enterprises).
See generally THE WORLD BANK, GENERAL PRINCIPLES FOR CREDIT REPORTING (2011)
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/662161468147557554/pdf/70193-2014-CR-GeneralPrinciples-Web-Ready.pdf [https://perma.cc/2NKK-2ZZA] (providing a most frequently used
international standard on credit reporting for middle income and developing jurisdictions).
17. See Allen M. Berger, Marco A. Espinosa-Vega, W. Scott Frame & Nathan S. Miller, Debt
Maturity, Risk, and Asymmetric Information, 60 J. FIN. 2895, 2898–2902 (2005) (discussing creditors’ use
of “firm-specific private information” in assigning risk ratings for determining debt maturity).
18. An increase in the amount and the quality of the information available on micro-businesses (and
generally on MSMEs) may be achieved in a number of alternative, additional ways. Most are inevitably
linked with formality. Some are voluntary: for example, creation of information databases in chambers
of commerce. Some are mandatory: in some jurisdictions, businesses must register and file accounts at
the end of each fiscal year.
19. See supra Part IV.B.1.
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lending operations, not just in the case of MSMEs—using aggregated data fed
into complex equations that consider the probability of default based on the
context and the circumstances of debtors. Arguably, this constitutes the main
source of the decision-making process of the banking business at a strategic level.
However, by definition, this type of pre-determined, statistical-based approach
to lending cannot be a substitute for bespoke, case-by-case assessment of the risk,
especially in the case of micro-businesses, whose probability of default depends
on many factors, and whose default has deep social implications. It is one of the
main tenets of this article that these mechanisms should be complementary.
Neither the origination nor the monitoring of credit may be substituted by
aggregate data analysis.
This, and the following sections analyze mechanisms used by lenders to deal
with the risk assessment of micro-businesses. First, lenders shorten the maturity
of loans.20 Combined with the small amount lent, this reduces risks associated
with the debtor’s moral hazard.21 Second, they charge higher interest rates to
micro-businesses.22 Third, it is customary for lenders to require personal
guarantees from shareholders, directors, or related parties (in the case of
individual entrepreneurs) to bolster their chances of being repaid. Due to the
asymmetry in bargaining power, micro-businesses often have little or no option
but to accept financing provided under such conditions.23
The situation described in the last section and the previous paragraph places
many micro-businesses in a difficult situation, with a very narrow working capital
and a very limited ability to grow.24 But, perhaps more importantly, the use by
banks of other risk management devices, instead of a case-by-case risk
assessment, undermines one of the most important functions played by the
20. Studies have analyzed how short maturities help alleviate problems associated with risk and
asymmetric information. See Hernan Ortiz-Molina & M.F. Penas, Lending to Small Businesses: The Role
of Loan Maturity in Addressing Information Problems, 30 SMALL BUS. ECON. 361, 381–82 (2008)
(analyzing small business in the United States and determining that short loan maturities “mitigate the
problems associated with borrower risk and asymmetric information”). Other studies have analyzed the
relationship between information and maturity. See Douglas W. Diamond, Debt Maturity Structure and
Liquidity Risk, 106 Q. J. ECON. 709, 711 (1991) (analyzing how private information may influence a
borrower’s choice of short-term debt); Raghuram G. Rajan, Insiders and Outsiders: The Choice Between
Informed and Arm’s–Length Debt, 47 J. FIN. 1367, 1390 (1992) (suggesting that a firm should match its
debt maturity to “the revelation of credible, accurate public information”).
21. See supra Part IV.C.1.
22. See supra Part IV.B.5. On the face of it, this would seem like a contradiction, because, under
normal conditions, interest rates are determined as a function of risk, so the shorter the term to maturity
(as opposed to loans provided to larger businesses for longer terms), the lower the interest rate. However,
an increase in the interest rate in loans to micro-business also factors in the relatively excessive overhead
costs.
23. See discussion infra Part III. In part, as observed in Part III, this explains the fact that bank
financing constitutes a relatively low percentage of the overall financing of micro-businesses in almost
every region of the planet, including—albeit to a lesser extent—in fully developed jurisdictions.
24. Not surprisingly, the average life of micro-businesses is usually low, even in the most developed
economies. See Hanas A. Carder & John C. Leatherman, Small Business Survival and Sample Selection
Bias, 37 SMALL BUS. ECON. 155, 160 tbl.2 (2011) (presenting the frequency of firm deaths in the United
States).
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financial sector of any economy: the intermediation function. Banks are supposed
to channel the savings of the population to the productive economy by lending
the money of depositors to viable businesses. If the assessment of viability is
absent precisely where it is most needed (namely, where there are no public
sources of relevant information, such as filed audited accounts or market listing),
the economy suffers, because the eventual result is likely to be a NPL and the
insolvency of a large portion of the micro-businesses. Thus, there will be less
money available to lend to viable businesses. Moreover, proper assessment is in
the banks’ own interests because they can thereby ensure long-term, profitgenerating borrowers, rather than borrowers who cannot pay interest and who
generate enforcement costs.
Several measures may be adopted to increase the involvement of banks in the
assessment process. First, banks could adopt classic relationship-banking
techniques, such as close links between banker and customer,25 and the
cultivation of a long-term relationship by using short term, repeat lending
facilities, such as an overdraft. The consequent increase in the information
available would aid banks in assessing risk at a lower cost. Second, banks should
ensure that they have an adequate internal organization. Third, they should use
the types of secured transactions that align the viability of the business with the
value of the collateral, such as floating charges or charges over the going concern
value of the business.
3. The Use of Collateral
In addition to the risk mitigation techniques mentioned in the last two
sections,26 lenders are likely to manage the risk of lending to micro-businesses by
taking some form of real security.27 A micro-business is not likely to have the
types of fixed assets lenders prefer to be given as collateral, such as real estate.
Instead, what is available is movable property, usually circulating assets such as
inventory, receivables and cash. A legal system that does not permit security to
be taken over such assets28 will hamper the availability of credit: what is required
is legal reform enabling security to be taken over future assets, while enabling the
grantor to dispose of such assets in the ordinary course of business. This also has
the advantage, as mentioned earlier,29 that security is taken over assets whose
value aligns with the value of the business, so that monitoring and control of those
assets forces the lender to continue to assess the viability of the micro-business
throughout the life of the loan.

25. This could relate both to the period before any loan is made, if potential borrowers are account
holders, and to the period after the initial loan is made.
26. See supra Parts IV.B.1, IV.B.2.
27. But see infra Parts III.B. (noting an exception to this is the institution of micro-finance, which is
unsecured and relationship based).
28. Or one which, for example, requires the specific identification of the assets which are the subject
of the security interest in the security agreement.
29. See supra Parts IV.B.1, IV.B.2.
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To get the full benefit of security, the lender must be sure that it will have
priority over any other competing claimants to the collateral, and that it can
enforce cheaply, quickly, and easily. On the other hand, the small amount of the
loan means that, for the loan to be economic for the lender, the costs of taking
security must be low. Again, a reformed system of secured transactions law (that
is, in line with UNCITRAL’s Model Law30), which includes a modern, electronic,
register of security interests in which registration can be effected online, at a very
low fee (merely enough to cover for the cost of maintenance of the Registry),
without technicality and in advance of the actual grant of security, and where
registration guarantees priority over most competing claimants will enable all of
these requirements to be met. Moreover, the system needs to include efficient
means of enforcement, including the ability to enforce out of court. This is
because court proceedings can be both costly and slow, and the prospect of
having to enforce in that way is likely to disincentivize lenders.31
While the characteristics of secured transactions law mentioned in the last
two paragraphs provide a legal framework in which lenders will be more willing
to extend secured credit to micro-businesses, their inclusion in a secured
transactions law does also increase the likelihood of adverse consequences for
borrowers. If it is possible to take security over circulating assets and intangibles,
a lender is likely to over-collateralize,32 and the mere fact that the lender is
protected by collateral may disincentivize pre-lending due diligence and postlending monitoring.33 It is therefore important that taking security is not a
substitute for proper individual risk assessment,34 but is seen as additional,
longstop, protection.
4. The Use of Guarantees
As mentioned earlier, guarantees are widely used as a risk management
technique in the province of micro-business financing.35 The guarantor is usually
a specially related party: either a family member, when the main debtor is an
individual entrepreneur; or shareholders and directors (if they are different), in
the case of legal entities. When lending to micro-businesses, and in the absence
of real estate, banks seem to prefer guarantees to security rights over movable
collateral,36 although guarantees can themselves be secured if collateral is
30. See U.N. COMMISSION ON INT’L TRADE L. [UNCITRAL], UNCITRAL MODEL L. ON
SECURED TRANSACTIONS, U.N. Sales No. E.17.V.1 (2016) [hereinafter UNCITRAL MODEL LAW].
31. See infra Part IV.C.3.a.
32. See infra Part IV.D.
33. But see infra Part III.B (noting that depending on the type of collateral, post-lending monitoring
may be enhanced).
34. See discussions supra Parts IV.B.1 and IV.B.2.
35. See supra Part III.
36. This is a common finding in the World Bank’s Insolvency and Creditor’s Rights Regimes Report
on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ICR ROSC). Some of these reports may be accessed here:
Global Insolvency Law Database, THE WORLD BANK, http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/
financialsector/brief/global-insolvency-law-database [https://perma.cc/F8J4-SM2N] (last visited Feb. 17,
2018).
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available. In a way, it can be said that guarantees are the “collateral” of the
poorer market participants.
A guarantee enhances the assets available for repayment and hence reduces
the risk of the bank. But this is not the only, and perhaps not the main, reason
why banks commonly request the provision of guarantees. As well as operating
as a risk mitigation technique, the provision of guarantees reduces the borrower’s
moral hazard and therefore the lender’s agency costs. Where a micro-business is
a legal entity, the personal guarantee of the shareholder or director closely aligns
that person’s interests with that of the business and incentivizes diligence in its
management. In the case of a sole entrepreneur, the giving of a guarantee by a
family member reduces the incentives of the borrower to disperse funds to
alternative uses, and may incentivize that family member to monitor the
operation of the business.37 Because these effects cause a reduction in the risk of
lending, and hence increase the willingness of lenders to provide finance and, at
least theoretically, lower its price, there are sound reasons to protect this lending
practice.
However, guarantees may also create undesirable effects. Guarantees render
the separation of legal personality between shareholders or directors and the
legal entity useless. Limited liability ceases to exist, with all the negative
externalities that such loss entails. On the personal side, it is not infrequent that
guarantees come from the spouse, parents and other persons closely related to
the sole entrepreneur, or even to the shareholder or director of a company. As a
consequence, the failure of the micro-business to repay spreads to the guarantor
and causes dramatic financial problems for the whole household, and may even
generate household insolvency. This may become especially problematic, given
the asymmetry in bargaining power, where financial institutions do not behave
reasonably in relation to enforcement, and the authorities often do not supervise
properly.
Given the positive and negative aspects of the widespread use of guarantees
in micro-business financing practice, legislators need to enact regulation that
strikes an adequate balance, to the extent that this is possible. In the period
before the debtor defaults, it should be possible for a guarantor to set aside a
guarantee under the general law only in the case of fraud or other serious abuse
such as duress.38 Another type of abuse by banks occurs when the following
conditions are fulfilled: first, the guarantor is not a shareholder or director of a
micro-business nor a sole entrepreneur, in which case he is likely to be a family
member or a related person; second, at the time the bank requested and received
the guarantee, the guarantor was, on an objective assessment, not in a position to
37. See Douglas G. Baird, Security Interests Reconsidered, 80 VA. L. REV. 2249, 2263 (1994)
(analyzing the use of the guarantee mechanism by institutional lenders); Avery Wiener Katz, An
Economic Analysis of the Guarantee Contract, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 47, 70–71 (1999) (suggesting that unlike
non-familial guarantors, family members may have additional incentives to monitor, such as a “perceived
moral obligation,” which may lower a lender’s risk).
38. If the guarantor becomes insolvent within a short period of time after giving the guarantee, the
guarantee may be able to be set aside under the law relating to avoidance of transactions.
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meet the guaranteed obligation, nor was it objectively probable that he would be
in that position during the maturity period of the loan.39 In this situation, the
guarantee can be seen as taken only to harness the borrower’s behavior. The first,
ex ante, response to this abuse is that supervisors should actively monitor and act
against abusive practices by banks (and the legislation should provide
mechanisms for micro-businesses to alert the relevant agency of abusive
behavior). The second, ex post, response should only operate when the debtor
defaults or is insolvent. Here, it is suggested that a bank should not be able to
enforce a guarantee against an individual when the two conditions mentioned
above are fulfilled, and when, in addition, the guarantor is not able to pay at the
time of enforcement, as the circumstances do not, in isolation, justify
enforcement against an individual who will be forced into personal insolvency.40
Countervailing factors may, of course, point towards enforcement being
permitted in a particular case.
Measures are also necessary when the micro-business is subject to insolvency
proceedings. At the very least, rules must be enacted to coordinate the insolvency
proceedings, and earlier out of court solutions, relating to the guarantor and the
micro-business.41 For example, such rules might allow a common filing, assign
competence to the same court, appoint one insolvency representative for both
insolvencies, and ensure adequate separation of estates. Further, the insolvency
system ought to have in place a consistent regime of debt discharge.
5. Problems Arising from the Process of Contract Formation
The terms on which the lender provides finance will be contained in the
financing agreement, which, in the case of a micro-business, will inevitably be on
the standard terms of the lender because the lender is the repeat player, and has
by far the greater bargaining power. Moreover, the extensive use of standard
term contracts contributes to reducing the transaction costs: negotiation and any
resulting variation in terms could tip the cost of the transaction over the level a
lender would consider economic. Most micro-businesses, anyway, not only do not
have the bargaining power to negotiate, they also do not have the necessary
knowledge and sophistication.
This approach is likely to result in a package of terms that are heavily
weighted in favor of the lender. These terms normally include both procedural
terms, such as limitations in the methods of draw-down and repayment, the
39. This would not apply where the guarantee is secured with collateral, at least to the value of the
collateral.
40. See, e.g., Ronald B. Davis, Stephan Madaus, Alberto Mazzoni, Irit Mevorach, Riz Mokal,
Justice Barbara Romaine, Janis Sarra & Ignacio Tirado, A Modular Approach to Micro, Small, and
Medium Enterprise Insolvency Chapter VI. 5. C (2018) (unpublished manuscript) (previous version on
file at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2904858 [https://perma.cc/XB75-HGZK]) for
a discussion of how the German Constitutional Court (followed by the civil law section of the Supreme
Court) has refused to enforce a guarantee given by a related person on these grounds.
41. See David Hahn, Velvet Bankruptcy, 7 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 523, 534–38, 540–42 (2006)
(discussing the abuse of personal guarantees for corporate business and how pre-insolvency (and
insolvency) law may solve the problem).
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methods whereby the borrower is notified of changes, and how and where
disputes are resolved, and substantive terms, such as the level of interest and the
level of payments after default, as well as the definition of default itself.
Arguably, a restrictive package of terms is a method of keeping financing costs
low: flexibility and personalization cost the lender money. Moreover, lenders
would argue that high rates of interest, and particularly default interest, reflect
the risks undertaken in lending to micro-businesses.
The danger of this approach to micro-businesses is apparent. Many of the
terms mentioned are likely to be substantively detrimental to the business. This
is substantive unfairness. Moreover, given that standard terms are likely to be in
small print and in technical and complicated language, they are likely to be
procedurally unfair: the individual running the micro-business probably will not
appreciate the content of the terms when he signs the contract. The detrimental
effect will only become clear at the stage when the term becomes relevant, at
which point the content of the term may well be such as to cause severe damage
to the business, and maybe even drive it into insolvency.
Legal techniques exist to tackle procedural unfairness and, to a lesser extent,
substantive unfairness. Procedural unfairness can, to some extent, be tackled by
mandatory disclosure of information in a prescribed form, including standardized
methods of displaying charges so as to aid comparison. While such measures are
relatively cheap and straightforward to implement, there is a danger that rigid
formality may be counterproductive, especially if the sanction for noncompliance is that the contract is void. This is because a lender may be
disincentivized from lending because of the risk that its legal rights against the
borrower may be severely reduced if it makes one typographical error. Another
technique is to provide that an unfair term is unenforceable by the party relying
on it. These techniques are much more developed in relation to consumer
contracts than to business contracts.42 Although it is not entirely straightforward
to apply techniques used in the consumer field to contracts to micro-businesses,
there is no technical reason why this cannot be done, provided that the definition
of micro-business is robust and the context is made clear.
First, non-financial terms will be considered. These are terms that do not
concern interest rates or charges. Here, legislation can apply a standard that
addresses both procedural and substantive unfairness.43 The substantive test
42. Compare Council Directive 93/13/EEC, art. 3–5, 1993 O.J. (L 95) 29, 31 (EC) (providing
guidelines for assessing the unfairness of terms in consumer contracts), with Commission Proposal for a
Regulation of the European Parliament of the Council on a Common European Sales Law, art. 86, COM
(2011) 635 final (Oct. 11, 2011) (defining “unfair” in business contracts between traders), and Unfair
Contract Terms Act 1977, c. 50, § 2–7 (UK) (applying only to limitation and exclusion clauses in business
contracts), and common law rules against penalties (whereby a liquidated damages clause can be struck
down if it “imposes a detriment on the contract-breaker out of all proportion to any legitimate interest
of the innocent party in the enforcement of the primary obligation.” See Cavendish Square Holding BV
v. Talal El Makdessi [2015] UKSC 67, [32]).
43. See Council Directive 93/13/EEC, supra note 42, at Annex 1(i), art. 3–5 (including as “unfair”
those terms which are not individually negotiated, and which cause a significant imbalance in the parties’
rights and obligations arising under the contract, to the detriment of the consumer); Unfair Contract
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must, however, be applied in context. Although a term, looked at in isolation,
may seem unfair, it must be considered as part of the package, including the cost
of borrowing: a lower interest rate may compensate for some flexibility in other
areas. Lenders could also argue that in order to make lending to micro-businesses
economic, processes need to be rigid and simple, since flexibility is costly.
Crafting a legislative test that enables an appropriate weight to be given to these
two points is difficult, and the unfairness bar should probably be set reasonably
high so as only to target really abusive terms. Further, lenders can argue that the
mere fact that a term could be set aside under unfair terms legislation makes
lending more uncertain, and therefore more expensive, and less attractive. There
is no real answer to this argument, except competition between lenders. A
legislative test is no use, however, unless matters can be effectively brought to
court. It is extremely unlikely that a micro-business would have the resources to
challenge an unfair term in court. The best method is to enable an Ombudsman
or other institution, such as a chamber of commerce, to apply to court to have a
standard term struck out.44
Second, financial terms will be considered. These are in two categories: the
regular interest rates and charges, and the position on default. In relation to the
former, it can be argued that this is the price for the loan, and that the price must
be a matter for the agreement of the parties and the market, so that legislative
controls cannot apply to it. On this view, the only control that can be imposed is
a procedural one, that is, that the whole amount of the interest (including
charges) is made clear to the counterparty in a way that he can understand it and
compare it to that offered by other finance providers. A lender is likely to argue
that a high interest rate reflects the costs of lending to a micro-business: the very
small profit from a low value loan, the proportionately high costs of the
transaction and, especially, the extra risk due both to the high credit risk inherent
to the characteristics of a micro-business, and to the often very poor debt
collection systems. To some extent, a legal regime can mitigate the extra risk if it
makes it easy and cheap to take security over all available collateral, and to
enforce it properly, although it is not necessarily the case that a reduction in such
risk will actually result in a lower interest rate. Proportionately high costs can, to
some extent, be reduced by reform of the legal regime, though the need to have
a certain level of protection for the borrower will entail some costs. Another
response to the charging of high interest rates is to encourage maximum
competition among lenders: the lack of competition in the financial sector is one
of the real problems in developing and middle income countries, which is
externalized on the borrower by means of excessive interest rates.
High rates of interest or other charges, such as penalties or administrative
charges, which are imposed on default, are in a different category as they are not
Terms Act, supra note 42, § 11 (assessing reasonableness based upon the circumstances existing when
the contract was made).
44. See Consumer Rights Act 2015 c. 15, § 70, sch. 3 (UK) (allowing certain organizations to apply
for relief).
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part of the price of the loan. High default rates threaten the viability of the
business in the event of financial distress and impact on other creditors of the
borrower in the ensuing insolvency, rather than on the borrower itself. There is
also more likely to be procedural unfairness here. The individual is likely to be
aware of the headline rate of interest on the loan but is less likely to be aware of
the default rate, which may well be in small print. Even if he is aware of a high
default rate, if he needs finance he may agree to it thinking or hoping that default
“will never happen.”
It is possible to have legislative controls on default rates based on fairness.
For example, such controls could require a comparison between the rates charged
and the likely actual loss to the lender. However, such controls are likely to
produce uncertainty and therefore to disincentivize lending. Increasing
competition is less likely to assist in this area, since borrowers are unlikely to be
aware of the exact amount of default rates and are not likely to decide which
lender to use based on default rates, for the reasons given above. Therefore, other
techniques likely to make much inroad on high default rates are either a
legislative cap on default rates, such as in Germany or Spain,45 or action in the
insolvency of the micro-business, such as legislative subordination of default
interest to the other debts of the micro-business, as in Spain.46
C. The Lifecycle of the Financing Operation
The special circumstances of micro-businesses do not only create problems in
their access to credit; once the financing has been provided, practice shows that
both borrowers and lenders often conduct themselves in manners that are
suboptimal for the market of credit. The problems that arise during the lifecycle
of credit to micro-businesses feed into the ex ante position of the parties, and,
unless adequately tackled, may make lending less accessible and more expensive.
Due to length constraints, this article shall only refer to a few of those possible
problems.
1. The Behavior of the Debtor
With any loan, there is a danger that the borrower will allocate the funds to
uses other than those for which the financing was provided, or will otherwise act
in a way which increases the credit risk from that originally taken on by the
lender. In relation to loans to micro-businesses, the techniques set out above
partly mitigate the risk of this moral hazard is partly mitigated by the techniques
set out above.47 However, other techniques commonly used to control against the
debtor’s moral hazard are often absent. Monitoring by creditors is difficult (in
45. In Spain, the limit has been established by the Law 3/2004 “Of measures to fight against default
in commercial transactions”, as amended by the Law 31/2014. In Germany, see the interpretation of the
Courts of paras. 247 and 288 of their Civil Code (BGB): for more detail on the different types of caps on
interest rates, see the commentary in BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE], para. 247, 288,
(Beck Verlag 77 ed. 2017).
46. See Ley Concursal art. 93 (B.O.E. 2003, 164) (Spain).
47. See supra Part IV.B.
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good part due to the low level of formality and accounting practice) and, as
discussed in the next section, uncommon. Lenders provide financing through
simple agreements, often templates or basic boilerplate contracts, with no
covenants restricting activities that may increase the credit risk, or information
covenants creating reporting duties to enable monitoring. Debtors conduct
simple businesses, where, particularly but not exclusively in the case of sole
proprietors, the separation of assets and liabilities arising from the personal and
the business spheres is blurred48
The problem of moral hazard becomes more critical as a borrower
approaches a business crisis and default has occurred or is about to happen. The
general risk, which applies to all borrowers, that any action a borrower takes to
avoid or address financial distress in a way which protects creditors’ interest will
be untimely or inadequate, is much greater in relation to micro-businesses.
Micro-businesses tend to be the only source of income for the entrepreneur, and
frequently the business involves, in one way or another, several or all members
of his family. In this context, debtors put their heads in the sand, go through long
periods of negation, and, even after the financial distress has become clearly
apparent, delay taking appropriate action.
Frequently, a micro-business will not wish to draw the attention of the bank
to its financial distress. Thus, it will not make contact with the bank to discuss its
affairs, and will attempt to keep up the payments to the bank while defaulting on
payments to other creditors, such as employees or the tax authorities. A debtor
will be particularly reluctant for the bank to discover its financial difficulties when
the bank has a security right over its assets.49 If the security right enables the bank
to control the business, either directly or indirectly, on default, the debtor will try
to avoid losing it. However, if the collateral is a fixed asset, the debtor will not
seek help for fear of losing a key piece of equipment. Something similar happens
in unsecured lending by short term, or on-demand, revolving facilities, which
often include high default interest rates which a debtor will wish to avoid
incurring.
This has the effect that a director or an owner of a distressed micro-business
stays in control even when the business is balance sheet insolvent, so that the risk
of future loss falls entirely on the creditors. Value destruction almost inevitably
48. In some countries the legal framework sets a division between assets that are acquired and/or
used in the context of the business activity, and those that are acquired/used in the personal life of the
entrepreneur. Even in these countries, however, all assets are ultimately available to satisfy all creditors,
whatever the type of asset or the origin of the debt. See A. MARTINEZ, MICRO, SMALL AND MEDIUM
ENTERPRISES IN AFRICA: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 3 (2017), http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/
congress/Papers_for_Programme/135-MARTINEZ-SME_Enterprise_Insolvency_in_Africa.pdf
[https://perma.cc/FMG4-3ZTH].
49. A study conducted through interviews and questionnaires with banks showed that small
businesses only contact the bank when they are already financially distressed. Before showing its
weakness to the financial institution, a debtor will have already adopted measures with their employees
(reduction of salaries, suspension of the payment of wages or complements to wages, social security, etc.)
or have even stopped paying taxes. See Contractualised Distress Resolution in the Shadow of the Law,
CODIRE, https://www.codire.eu [https://perma.cc/J9Z7-PHUP] (last visited Feb. 17, 2018). “
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follows. Thus, while the measures suggested earlier relating to the initial stages
of the credit cycle will mitigate debtor moral hazard,50 perhaps the most effective
solution would be the inclusion of a system that incentivizes the use of preinsolvency and insolvency systems at an early stage of distress, and one that
sanctions late action: a combined set of sticks and carrots. One example of an
incentive is to allow the debtor to remain in possession during the restructuring
process, because otherwise a debtor would be unwilling to submit to such a
process. Another is to include a stay of actions and executions during a
negotiation period.
Alas, experience shows that, particularly in the case of family-based microbusinesses, incentives alone are not enough to overcome the fear of losing control
of the destiny of the business and of the reputational damage brought about by
insolvency and insolvency-related procedures. In the light of this, the legal
framework needs to include a duty to act in a way that minimizes damage to
creditors from the moment the business is, or is about to be, unable to pay its
debts as they fall due. Depending on the legal tradition and of the degree of
sophistication of the legal system, either a duty to file for insolvency or a system
that makes directors liable for wrongful trading, such as that which operates in
common law jurisdictions,51 needs to be present. However, because they are
finely balanced, actions for wrongful trading are rare and do not always succeed
because of the complexity of the rules. Moreover, the system operates on the
basis that directors of companies will wish to comply, and will take legal advice
as to what is permitted. This works where there are sophisticated market
participants, but might be inappropriate for micro-businesses, who are
unsophisticated and have few resources for legal advice. Moreover, a director of
a micro-business or a sole entrepreneur will have no resources to pay damages.
Thus, to provide the correct incentive, a system of sanctions for misbehaving
directors and sole entrepreneurs would need to supplement wrongful trading
provisions. The alternative, more common in a civil law system, and perhaps
more apt in jurisdictions with unsophisticated courts, is the inclusion of a duty to
file. While more limited in its scope, the duty to file has the advantage of
providing a clear-cut rule for debtors and directors, with no need for an ex post
complex analysis of their behavior: something often all but impossible to do given
the limited information available in micro-businesses. Moreover, breach triggers
sanctions as well as a damages claim.52

50. See supra Parts IV.B, IV.C.1.
51. A preference for wrongful trading solutions has now become standard, following its adoption
by UNCITRAL. See generally UNCITRAL, UNCITRAL LEGISLATIVE GUIDE ON INSOLVENCY LAW,
U.N. Sales No. E.13.V.10 (2013).
52. See Davis supra note 40, at 42–53 (debating the pros and cons of both systems, from the
standpoint of MSMEs).
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2. The Behavior of Lenders
As mentioned, not infrequently, banks finance micro-businesses without a
proper risk assessment based on the viability of the business project.53 This
passivity is also replicated in the stage that runs from the provision of the funds
to the moment of repayment: lenders do not monitor the operation of the microbusiness borrower. Moreover, most financing instruments do not include
covenants that oblige borrowers to give information periodically, or restrictive
covenants that require borrowers to ask permission to act in a way that adversely
affects the risk profile of the loan.54 Banks, particularly in developing- and
middle-income economies, do not have special departments that monitor
businesses during the life of the loan. Small loans to micro-businesses are mainly
decided locally, at a branch level, where the main bulk of the activity is
commercial, that is, focused on credit-origination. Despite this, it would be
possible for a bank to monitor more effectively than described, given that it is in
a position to insist that the micro-business holds its current account with that
bank, so that the bank is in a unique position to monitor the business’s cash flow.
Technological advances mean that this monitoring need not require extensive
activity by the bank’s employees.55 The lack of monitoring mentioned above,
coupled with the characteristics of micro-businesses, explains why lenders only
realize the existence of a problem with the loan when it is already too late.
The behavior of micro-businesses though, is more predictable than the
behavior of banks once the financial distress of the debtor has become apparent.
The behavior of banks in this situation depends largely on the context. There are,
however, common trends.
In jurisdictions with weak banking sectors or countries undergoing, or just
emerging from, financial crises, financial institutions often prefer to roll over
problem loans in order to avoid increasing the amount of distressed assets (NPLs)
in their balance sheet. Forbearing supervisors sometimes overlook this practice,
known as ever-greening or zombie lending, and financial institutions frequently
do this without taking into account the repayment capacity of the distressed
borrower.56 Banks also sometimes behave in this way even if the financial sector
is not troubled, if the value of the collateral does not depreciate quickly.

53. See discussion supra Part IV.B.2.
54. See supra Part IV.B.1.
55. As mentioned, concerning the origination of credit, banks would substitute monitoring by a
statistical analysis of aggregate data. While such practice is indeed relevant, it cannot, by itself, solve the
problem created by the lack of monitoring. See supra Part IV.B.2.
56. This happens also in highly sophisticated financial systems, like the Japanese one. In the wake
of the economic downturn caused by the great earthquake of 2011, special measures concerning the
treatment of NPLs of small and medium size enterprises were adopted. These measures are still in place
today, without a clear justification. See generally Ignacio Tirado, Banking Crises and the Japanese Legal
Framework (Discussion Paper No 2017-E-2), INST. FOR MONETARY AND ECON. STUD. (2017).
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Banks, however, may also behave in exactly the opposite way in that, on
default, they immediately foreclose or enforce any security interests. If there is
no collateral, they seize bank accounts or any other identified free asset, as well
as calling in the guarantees. They do this without analyzing the debtor´s viability,
resulting in the near inevitable loss of the going concern value and the destruction
of any rescue possibilities that may have existed.57 While ever-greening keeps
economically distressed micro-businesses alive in an artificial and undesirable
manner, this latter approach has the potential to destroy valuable enterprises.
Alternatively, banks may outsource credit recovery to a debt collection
agency, wherein a specialized entity, acting as an agent, recovers troubled loans,
or banks themselves may sell the portfolio to distressed debt funds. Such sales
tend to involve loans that are long overdue or whose recovery has been attempted
several times unsuccessfully, and are priced at a very large discount. Unlike a
bank, which may benefit from future business with the borrower, a debt
collection agency or distressed debt fund does not have any incentive to
restructure the loan or to engage in negotiations that may lead to the preservation
of the value of a rescuable business. The sale of loans, often regarded as good
banking practice because it cleans banks’ balance sheets, nevertheless has
potential to destroy business value.
Another issue that needs to be addressed concerns the behavior of banks
within insolvency proceedings, which in a broad sense, includes hybrid
restructuring proceedings. Here, banks often behave passively: they do not
engage in negotiations, or may even decline to participate or to vote on
insolvency plans. This is particularly the case in relation to MSMEs, and even
more so with micro-businesses. All too often, the lack of participation of the
bank, characteristically a large creditor in relative terms, may hinder the rescue
of viable businesses.58
Some of the problems described earlier in this subsection may be addressed
by legislative and institutional action. On the preventive side, an early warning
system may be implemented. This measure has been expressly included in the
EU Directive Proposal on Restructuring and Second Chance of November
2016,59 and there are already examples in some jurisdictions.60 Drawing from the
design of bank resolution systems, where an early identification of the problem
is paramount, an early warning system consists in stipulating certain objective
57. This applies to the general seizure of assets or to enforcement/foreclosure over assets, but does
not necessarily apply where there is a floating charge or any other type of security that makes the
preservation of the going concern value of the business possible.
58. See Davis et al., supra note 40, at 70–122 (providing a thorough analysis of bank participation in
the insolvency of MSMEs).
59. Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on
Preventative Restructuring, Insolvency and Discharge Procedures and Amending Directive 2012/30/EU,
at 39, COM (2016) 723 final (Nov. 22, 2016) [hereinafter Commission Proposal].
60. Denmark has created a platform of early detection and prompt action through social advisers,
economic experts and lawyers that help distressed micro-businesses. See Early Warning – Experiences
from Denmark, EARLY WARNING, http://startvaekst.dk/earlywarning.dk/earlywarning_experiences
_from_denmark [https://perma.cc/VM87-N3K7] (last visited Nov. 26, 2017).
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events. Such events may include default in payments to employees or social
security contributions or tax debts. The occurrence of these events alerts
creditors and triggers possible remedies. Debtors, and, maybe, third parties such
as accountants, could be incentivized or mandated to report such events to the
lender.61 Apart from providing banks with clearly identifiable signs of financial
distress, the inclusion of these triggers is likely to alter the behavior of debtors
described earlier,62 so that debtors will be more willing to default early on bank
debt. This may have an impact in the cost of lending that needs to be assessed.
The supervision of the financial sector should also be addressed. One
possibility is to increase supervisory control over banks’ management of their
loan portfolios. Another area where effective measures may be adopted relates
to the regulation of insolvency proceedings. Default rules that sanction
disinterest may tackle problems of creditor passivity in out-of-court hybrid
workouts or in formal insolvency proceedings. For example, there could be a rule
whereby creditors that do not object to their insolvency entitlements may not
later allege a different set of rights. Another possible rule would be that creditors
who do not participate in voting in relation to a plan are deemed to have
approved it.63
3. Collection and Enforcement
The need to keep transaction costs low because of the low value of loans also
impacts on the way in which a lender can enforce on default. Enforcement needs
to be cheap and simple: this can be achieved by a combination of reform to legal
rules and development of suitable infrastructure.
If a loan is secured, the lender will have a right to enforce against the
collateral. If not, or if the collateral is not sufficient, the lender will have to obtain
a court judgment and then enforce it through the system for execution of
judgments. Each of these will be examined in turn below.
a. Secured lending. One of the benefits of secured lending is that the lender
can look to the asset for payment of the secured obligation on default. In the
absence of security over an asset, the lender has to obtain a court judgment, and
enforce against the borrower’s assets. If, however, a secured lender must use
court proceedings in order to enforce against assets, this particular advantage of
secured lending is lost. Although it depends upon the system, court proceedings
usually add cost and delay. In a handful of countries it is possible to obtain a court
order within a very short period of time and in the absence of the borrower. In
other systems, undoubtedly the majority in developing and middle-income
countries, but even common in some developed jurisdictions, borrowers abuse
the procedural system with endless appeals: they postpone hearings, for example,
61. See Commission Proposal, supra note 59, at 27.
62. See supra Part IV.C.1 (describing the tendency of debtors to default on obligations to their
employees or to tax authorities before defaulting on bank or supplier debt).
63. See Davis et al., supra note 40, at 20–29, 30–39 for a further explanation of these principles and
their justification, expressly for the case of micro-businesses.
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by not coming to court or ignoring notices. Additionally, court fees are high, and
judges tend to observe a pro-debtor tendency that severely hampers an efficient
collection. While, in the first case, court proceedings add relatively little to the
time and cost of enforcement, in the more common context, court proceedings
are a very considerable cost in terms of time and money.
There are four possible complementary approaches to this issue. The first is
to improve the court infrastructure to minimize the time and money costs of court
proceedings relating to enforcement. A second approach would be to streamline
the law on procedure by limiting the ability of the parties to challenge ancillary
elements of the procedure, such as the appointment of appraisers; restricting the
need for court hearings; and ensuring there are very limited grounds for
reopening the court decision.64 In line with this, the use of court proceedings
could be limited to where there is a real dispute between the parties, for example,
where the borrower alleges a good arguable defense to the claim of default. The
third approach is for the legal system to permit, and maybe provide, alternative
means of resolving disputes or of heading off further disputes, such as binding
alternative dispute resolution which is only open to very limited court challenge.
The fourth is for the legal system to permit out of court enforcement, because
this can usually be carried out far more quickly and cheaply than enforcement via
the courts, although this will depend on the points made earlier. However, a
system of out of court enforcement needs to include some protection for the
debtor: this often takes the form of a notification system before possession is
taken or other enforcement takes place, restrictions on the ability of the
enforcing creditor to go onto the debtor’s premises, rules preventing the
enforcing creditor from causing a breach of the peace, and some sort of general
standard of good faith or reasonableness applying to the whole process.65 While
these protections are even more important in the case of a micro-business, and
particularly of an individual, that is vulnerable to oppressive conduct, protections
such as those mentioned make the process more uncertain and costly. A balance,
therefore, needs to be found between the need for a simple and cheap out of
court enforcement process, and a reasonable level of protection for the debtor.66
b. Unsecured lending. If the loan is not secured, officers, who are often
appointed and supervised by the court, perform enforcement, rather than the
creditor itself. First, there needs to be some process whereby a judgment, or
equivalent, is obtained so that the enforcement officers can be instructed. Again,
for a low value debt owing by a micro-business, obtaining such an order needs to
be a quick and cheap process. Although a reformed court system could effect
64. In the case of micro-businesses, the use of “bad lawyering” to forestall proceedings is less
frequent, precisely because of the defendant´s lack of resources to use expensive lawyers. However, the
problem is often acute when it comes to notifications.
65. See discussion infra Part IV.C.3.d (discussing measures specifically relating to enforcement
against individuals).
66. It is worth noting that micro-finance institutions hardly ever sue in court. Their collection
mechanisms are usually out of court.
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this,67 alternatively, the system could permit a binding decision to be made using
alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, including online mechanisms. Again,
some provision would need to be made for the protection of the debtor such as
proper notification of the decision making process and a right to be heard, and it
should not be possible to contract out of this protection. The precise balance
between the simplicity and cheapness of the system, and the protection of the
debtor will vary according to the circumstances. For example, it could be possible
to reduce costs by effective use of technology rather than by reducing the level of
debtor protection, especially in those jurisdictions where technology is available.
Second, once an order is obtained, there needs to be an efficient infrastructure of
(probably) court appointed officers who, as repeat players, can carry out
enforcement effectively, but at low cost.
c. Secondary markets. Most of the assets available for enforcement,
whether of secured or unsecured lending to micro-businesses, will be tangible,
and therefore potentially illiquid, assets. It is thus critical that there is some kind
of a secondary market in which these goods can be sold. Lack of such markets
will make these assets less useful as collateral, and will disincentivize lending.
There are now innovative ways in which such markets exist, or can be created,
such as online auctions. While these markets can, and do, arise in the private
sector, it is also possible for the government to create a market specifically for
the sale of collateral. Of course, a certain level of economic activity is required in
a state to enable such a market to work, and the costs of virtual markets for
tangibles may outweigh their usefulness. Moreover, some minimum protection is
still required for debtors and junior creditors to ensure that goods are not sold at
artificially low prices, though the level of protection needs to be kept fairly low,
such as with a duty of good faith, if the costs of sale are not to eat up too much of
the value of the asset.
d. Special considerations concerning individual debtors. On default by a
micro-business, enforcement is often going to be against the assets of an
individual, either as sole entrepreneur or guarantor. Unlike a corporate business,
whose assets are purely business assets, the assets of a sole entrepreneur are both
business and personal, while those of a guarantor are solely personal.68
Enforcement against personal assets raises a number of issues. The issues are the
same whether the debt is secured against, inter alia, the personal assets or
unsecured, although where the debt is unsecured, enforcement will be by a court
appointed officer, as mentioned above.69

67. See supra IV.C.3.a.
68. An individual could conceivably have assets relating to a separate business other than the one
whose debts are guaranteed.
69. See supra Part IV.C.3.b.
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First, if enforcement were permitted against all the personal assets of an
individual debtor, whether or not that individual were in bankruptcy proceedings,
the debtor, and maybe his family, would be left with nothing on which to live.
This is likely to lead to social unrest, so, as a matter of policy, most states provide
for certain exempt goods against which enforcement cannot be made, as well as
a limited amount of the individual’s future income.70 While this reduces the assets
available for creditors, and, therefore, could disincentivize lending, such
provisions are important, both on humanitarian grounds, and because, usually,
exempt goods will include tools or other goods used in the individual’s trade or
profession. Thus, despite the failure of the micro-business the individual ran or
guaranteed, she will still be able to either find work or even to start a new
business. This will prevent the individual and her family from being reliant on
whatever assistance is provided by the state, if any, for those who cannot afford
to live. The precise boundaries of what counts as exempt goods will depend, both
on the context of that particular state and its population, and on the balance
thought necessary to be struck between protecting individuals and, therefore,
society, and encouraging lending by permitting as full a recovery as possible.
Second, the procedure for enforcement against the personal assets of an
individual needs to be somewhat different from that used for enforcement against
businesses.
D. The Institutional Framework
The previous sections have identified some of the institutional problems that
affect the financing of micro-businesses, especially concerning enforcement and
insolvency. But the institutional framework plays a very relevant role throughout
the entire life-cycle of credit: from its origination to its situation on the verge of
and within insolvency proceedings, the financial regulation and its supervision
greatly influence the behavior of the parties and hence, ultimately, the validity of
the system.
As noted, the regulatory and supervisory frameworks find themselves in an
inherent conflict with other relevant interests existing in the market. Central
banks and financial supervisors have as their objective the protection of the
financial sector, and the rules they draft concerning financial institutions,
compliance with which they also monitor, reflect this. The focus of the rules is on
financial institutions as debtors, and, therefore, mainly concerns their solvency.71
In the light of this, regulations, and the consequent supervision, tend to
strengthen the financial positions of regulated and supervised institutions. On the
other side of the equation, though, lie borrowers (in our case, micro-businesses).
70. See, e.g., ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG [ZPO] [CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE] § 850 (Ger.); LEY DE
ENJUICIAMIENTO CIVIL [L.E. CIV.] [CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE] art. 605 (Spain).
71. By this we mean to include the regulation referred to the lending and investment activity of
banks. This is the case because the financial regulator observes this part of the balance sheet of banks
from the perspective of the risk of bank themselves. In other words, rules and supervision are aimed often
at ensuring a proper management of the assets of the supervised entities, with no regard to the situation
of the borrowers. The concern is about the solvency of banks.
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The harder the capital requirements however, the tougher the provisioning rules,
the tighter the requirements for the provision of credit to distressed but viable
smaller entities, the higher the chances that viable micro-businesses will end up
strangled and dead, and, with them, an important part of the productive
economy. Overprotecting financial institutions is a mistake. It undermines the
general, non-financial, economy and, in the mid- to long-term, harms the
financial position of financial institutions themselves by reducing their business.
Here, as in so many parts of this article, a balance needs to be struck. Due to
length constraints, only some of the most serious examples of this conflict will be
mentioned. In doing this, regulation and supervision will be dealt with separately,
although this division is somewhat artificial.
From a regulatory standpoint, most countries require lenders to operate a
proper risk management system, according to which lending should be made after
a thorough analysis of the viability of the business borrower. This is standard
good banking.72 However, not infrequently, regulations also include strong
capital requirements: loans and financing facilities to micro-businesses need to
have an initial percentage of provisioning, and the use of collateral is required or
at least strongly advised. Due to the general characteristics of micro-businesses,
this requirement often cannot be met. Although more developed systems have a
more relaxed attitude towards the lack of collateral, financial regulators in other
systems forbid the provision of financing to micro-businesses unless collateral is
provided. In the most extreme cases, the collateral needs to be land or something
similar. The problem is not only that collateral is mandatory, or that movable
collateral is not accepted as a valid risk mitigating factor, but also that the
framework does not relax its strict provisioning rules at any point in the life cycle
of credit, especially when there are signs of distress when security over movable
assets is provided.73 Another area where the regulatory framework is unfriendly,
not only to micro-businesses, but to MSMEs generally, concerns the rules
applicable when the borrower is in financial distress. Some jurisdictions have
rules that forbid or hinder banks from providing financing to troubled businesses,
either through out of court or hybrid work-outs or as part of formal insolvency
proceedings.74 This occurs despite the fact that the law provides for lenders of
new money to have a priority status and even where the debtor or its insolvency
representative offers fresh collateral. Restricting post-commencement finance
simply destroys any possibility for viable businesses to be rescued. Another
common regulatory problem is the inability of a bank to reclassify distressed
loans for regulatory purposes when the borrower has reached an out of court
agreement or an in-court insolvency plan, even though it is clear that this rescue
72. See generally BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, PRINCIPLES FOR THE SOUND
MANAGEMENT OF OPERATIONAL RISK 11–17 (2011) (outlining standard risk management principles).
73. Concerning the relationship between capital requirements and secured transactions (as a
mechanism to reduce risk), see Giuliano G. Castellano & Marek Dubovec, Credit Creation: Reconciling
Legal and Regulatory Incentives, 81 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 2018, at 63.
74. See, e.g., Ley de Instituciones de Crédito [LIC] [Credit Institutions Law] art. 65, 1990, 2016
(Mex.).
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can be implemented. Given these strict rules, banks have little or no incentive to
collaborate in restructuring viable businesses.
The main problems, however, lie not with the regulatory framework itself,
but with its application. Supervisors tend to be lenient in relation to
overcollateralization, or even directly promote it. Naturally, the more collateral
taken to secure the debt, the lower banks’ risk. Because of the asymmetry of
bargaining power and the scarce availability of credit for micro-businesses, banks
can impose financing operations with loan-to-value ratios well beyond 100%. The
less developed the jurisdiction and the less competitive the market, the more this
is the case. Demanding collateral greatly in excess of the credit provided has the
potential to cause substantive damage to the economy, particularly in developing
and middle income jurisdictions. It affects businesses that have fewer assets to
provide as collateral more severely, because, on the one hand, it hampers their
ability to access new financing, and tends to generate undesirable social
implications. On the other hand, third parties and family members are likely to
have to provide collateral. “Overcollateralization” is less problematic in
countries with a long-standing tradition of financing over all the business’s assets
and with well-functioning institutions. In these systems, overcollateralization of
the most senior lender does not necessarily bring about a reduction in credit
because a new lender may take second charges over the same assets. While this
is true in almost all jurisdictions, second (successive) charges over the same asset
only work properly when the transaction and enforcement costs are low.
Otherwise, every time a creditor enforces its security right, the value of the
collateral is diminished to a greater extent than the cancellation of the previous
debt, and substantive money is lost in the whole enforcement process, in terms of
both cost and of time.
Demanding excessive collateral requirements is not in accordance with
proper banking practice, and it should be censured by supervisors. The failure of
supervisors to do this is caused by the narrow focus on the short-term interest of
their supervised institutions. Supervisors ought instead to act in pursuit of the
general interest, there should be better coordination between financial
authorities and the relevant ministries: economy, trade, and development.
As mentioned earlier,75 it is relatively common, particularly in developing
jurisdictions and in countries lacerated by financial crises, that banks reschedule
loans almost as a matter of custom, without assessing the future viability of the
business. This ever-greening is a wrongful practice. It manipulates the financial
accounts of banks, and it deprives the system of a filter to identify viable,
rescuable financially distressed businesses. Just as banks ought to assess risk at
the onset of the lending operation, so should they get involved in the
restructuring of their viable borrowers. But the practice of ever-greening is only
one external sign of the more worrying tendency of banks to be passive in relation
to their portfolio of loans to micro-businesses. Banks simply do not bother to sit

75. See supra Part IV.C.2.

GULLIFER_TIRADO_CROSS REFERENCED PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

134

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

4/17/2018 4:50 PM

[Vol. 81:109

down with borrowers to renegotiate in cases of financial, rather than economic,
distress. From a financial regulatory standpoint, this problem may be tackled
mainly by two types of actions: first, the jurisdiction ought to have a code of
conduct mandating sufficient involvement of banks in the distress of smaller
debtors; second, supervisors must enforce such code of conduct. Enforcement
often necessitates a static and a dynamic component: supervisors must make sure
that banks have in place the necessary infrastructure to execute the task, such as
specialized teams, restructuring departments, a standardized and streamlined
flow of information between the disparate sections of the bank. They must also
conduct inspections and create communication channels with micro-businesses
to receive complaints of misbehavior.
V
CONCLUSION
Micro-businesses are important throughout the world, both economically and
as major employers. They have special characteristics which make it difficult for
them to access finance and, when finance is granted, affect the behavior of the
parties over the lifecycle of credit from origination, through its use in the
business, to repayment or default. This article seeks to map out the main issues
that arise in the life cycle of credit for micro-businesses, and to suggest possible
legal and institutional solutions.
One must bear in mind that there is an inherent tension between solutions
designed to increase access to finance and those designed to protect microbusinesses and individuals. This tension is evidenced both at the level of each of
the separate issues discussed in the article and in relation to the way in which the
responses to the various issues relate to each other. Thus, for example, permitting
easy and cheap access to collateral incentivizes lenders not to perform sufficient
due diligence and monitoring. If the latter is addressed by regulation, this may
raise costs making lending to micro-businesses less attractive economically.
These are just examples. There are interrelationships between all the issues
raised and between the possible legislative responses to those issues. In designing
legislative responses, therefore, the tensions must be identified and decisions
taken as to the correct balance.
The actual decisions as to balance are, of course, a matter of policy and
depend enormously on the context and the state of the market. All that can be
done here is to suggest the approaches that could be taken to make those
decisions. Applying the correct approach, however, is critical; it is as important
as tackling the issues in the first place.

